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Abstract
We explore the complementarities between high-skill emigration and poverty in
developing countries. We build a model endogenizing human-capital accumulation,
high-skill migration and productivity. Two countries sharing the same characteristics
may end up either in a “low poverty/low brain drain” path or in a “high poverty/high
brain drain” path. After identifying country-speciﬁc parameters, we ﬁnd that, for
a majority of countries, the observed equilibrium has higher income than the other
possible one. In 22 developing countries (including 20 small states with less than
2 million inhabitants), poverty and high brain drain are worsened by a coordination
failure. For 25 other countries, a radical worsening of economic performances is feasible.
These results are fairly robust to identiﬁcation assumptions and the inclusion of a brain-
gain mechanism.
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Many observers and scholars have long considered the brain drain as a curse for origin
countries in general, and for the developing world in particular. Although the new literature
is less pessimistic, and shows that positive spillovers can be induced by high-skill emigration,
it is fairly obvious that the brain drain aﬀects the human capital accumulation and economic
performance of sending countries. It is also largely recognized that lack of economic growth
and rampant poverty (going hand in hand with discrimination, political repression and lack
of freedoms) is what motivates people to ﬂee their own country.
The interdependencies between high-skill emigration and poverty in developing countries
are key to understanding the process of development. They can be the source of vicious
and virtuous circles linked to strategic complementarities in individual migration decisions.
Indeed, when a signiﬁcant brain drain movement is initiated, it may have damaging eﬀects
on the economy and induce other waves of high-skill emigration. On the contrary, when
a signiﬁcant return movement operates, it gives incentives to other waves of emigrants to
return home.
History has shown that massive and rapid outﬂows of high-skill people can generate economic
damage which is hard to reverse. An interesting case is that of Iran, where pre-revolutionary
economic development was rapid, although unevenly distributed among Iranians. The Ira-
nian brain drain (Torbat, 2002) started with the 1978-1979 revolution and was exacerbated
in the early 1980s by the war with Iraq and the decision of the government to reform Iran’s
higher education system. The trend continued afterwards and is seen by many observers
as one of the most important exoduses of talented academics, students, and researchers.
The pace of growth slowed dramatically after the revolution and Iran is still a lower-middle
income economy today. Since 2002, Iran’s parliament has tried to reverse its brain drain but
returns are still sporadic.
A more recent example is the former Soviet states. Many scientists and academics went
abroad after independence. Russian and Moldovian trade unions report that between half a
million and a million scientists and professionals have left the country since 1991. This has
worsened the economic situation and working conditions at origin; hence, almost none of the
brain drain emigrants have returned.
Breaking such vicious circles requires major reforms (democratic or dictatorial1). In the
1In the early sixties, the East German government opted for an authoritarian policy. After World War
II, the Potsdam agreement determined the borders of Germany and Berlin. After that, and until 1960, East
Germany suﬀered a huge brain drain to West Germany and a substantial inﬂow of Western students who
beneﬁtted from the free Eastern education system before returning to the West. By 1960, tens of thousands
21980s, the return of educated elites and high-skill workers played a crucial role in Taiwan’s
economic takeoﬀ, starting with the development of the information industry in Hsinchu.
The Irish case is another nice illustration of the vicious and virtuous eﬀects of high-skill
mobility. On the one hand, mass emigration of university and college graduates was observed
in the 1980s. This brain drain sucked the marrow out of Ireland’s social and economic
development. On the other hand, the major ﬁscal reforms embraced after 1987 attracted
foreign companies and investments. Since the late 1990s, there has been a huge return
migration, which contributed to the “Irish miracle” (Barrett, 2001).
The question addressed in this paper is: can a “high brain drain/high poverty”situation be
the result of a coordination failure, or is a brain drain an inevitable corollary of poverty, just
making the situation slightly worse? For each developing country, the data set compiled by
Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) gives precise information on the human capital level of
residents and emigrants. In 2000, the average skill-ratio (i.e. ratio of tertiary to non-tertiary
educated workers) of high-income countries was 0.243 (with values above 1 in the US and
Canada). In the same year, 23 developing countries would have exhibited a skill-ratio above
0.243 if all their high-skill emigrants returned home. Saint Kitts and Nevis (0.866) would
be close to the US and Canada; Grenada (0.611) and Dominica (0.471) and other small
states would be close to Australia (0.514). Other larger countries such as the Philippines
(0.333), Peru (0.309), Jamaica (0.279) and Latvia (0.271) would have more human capital
than many Western European countries. If such returns were large enough to generate a
rapid takeoﬀ and eradicate incentives to emigrate, brain drain and poverty could be seen
as resulting from a coordination failure. If not, the brain drain just worsens the situation.
The goal of this paper is to address this issue using an integrated model of human capital
accumulation, high-skill emigration and economic performance.
Surprisingly, the bi-directional causal link between emigration and poverty has only been
investigated unidirectionally in the recent brain-drain literature. Many empirical studies
focusing on the determinants of migration ﬂows have disregarded the composition of these
ﬂows. However, a few recent contributions have taken advantage of new databases on inter-
national migration by education level to investigate the determinants of the brain drain and
the skill composition of emigration ﬂows. Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007) showed that
the brain drain increases with political instability and the degree of fractionalization, and
decreases with the level of development at origin. Grogger and Hanson (2008) found that a
workers were moving from East to West every month, including about 40,000 with academic or professional
qualiﬁcations trained in East Germany. In the summer of 1961, the city of Berlin was walled oﬀ. Stopping the
vicious circle of brain drain and impoverishment (and the considerable abuse of the East German education
system) were the main economic reasons for building the Berlin wall.
3simple model of income maximization could account for positive selection (higher emigration
rates for the skilled) and positive sorting (positive eﬀect of wage diﬀerentials on the propor-
tion of skilled workers in bilateral migration). Rosenzweig (2007, 2008) used micro-data to
demonstrate that there are larger per-capita numbers of foreign students in the United States
from lower skill-price countries than from high skill-price countries, and host countries with
higher skill prices attract more foreign students. These studies clearly reveal that the size
and structure of international migration ﬂows are endogenous and depend on the economic
characteristics of source and host countries. In the empirical literature, these characteristics
are usually treated as exogenous (or instrumented).
Another literature focuses on the consequences of the brain drain on the welfare of those left
behind. The ﬁrst welfare theorem suggests that labor mobility increases the total amount
of welfare at the world level. It is Pareto-improving if those gains can be appropriately
redistributed among all parties concerned. When redistribution is impossible or costly, some
parties can be adversely aﬀected although the size of the pie is enlarged. This argument
can be decisive for those left behind if there are strong complementarities between skilled
and unskilled workers on the labor market, or if the ﬁscal cost of education is large and
totally supported by residents at origin. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) and McCullock and
Yellen (1975, 1977) were among the ﬁrst to stress the negative impact of the brain drain for
developing countries. The brain drain was seen as a zero sum game with the rich countries
getting richer and the poor countries getting poorer. Later, relying on the existence of exter-
nalities linked to human capital, the endogenous growth framework oﬀered an appropriate
environment to demonstrate that any loss of human capital can be detrimental for remaining
households (e.g., Miyagiwa, 1991, Haque and Kim, 1995). We will refer to this view as the
“traditional” brain drain literature. However, a newer literature (Mountford, 1997; Stark et
al., 1998; and Beine et al., 2001) suggests that the emigration of skilled workers can increase
sending-country educational investment and induce other positive feedback eﬀects. In par-
ticular, the prospect of emigration to countries where skills are rewarded more generously
can lead not only to increased investment in skills before migration (ex ante), but also to
a larger well educated domestic population after migration (ex post).2 We will refer to this
view as the “brain gain” literature. A problem with these “traditional” and “brain gain”
models is that they usually ignore the endogeneity of the emigration probability.
In this paper, we will build bridges between these two strands of literature and develop a
richer model allowing for coordination failures. We ﬁrst consider the traditional view and
disregard “brain gain” mechanisms. The reduced form of our model can be summarized
2Beine et al. (2008) found that a brain drain stimulates human capital formation before migration, and
estimated the net eﬀect of the brain drain on human capital accumulation for each developing country.
4by two equations, one endogenizing the level of development and the other endogenizing
human capital accumulation. Under certain conditions, the system generates indeterminacy
and multiple long-run equilibria. Multiplicity implies that two countries sharing particular
characteristics may end up on diﬀerent paths, a good one with low poverty and low brain
drain, or a bad one with high poverty and high brain drain. The properties of the equilibria
need not be identical across nations. They depend on the exogenous characteristics of nations
and policies. For example, small countries geographically or culturally close to the rich world
are likely to exhibit stronger elasticities of migration to the economic environment than large,
landlocked and remote countries.
We calibrate and simulate our model for 147 developing countries. Our numerical experi-
ments reveal that 22 countries (including 20 small states with less than 2 million inhabitants)
are suﬀering from coordination failure. In these countries, a positive shock or better expec-
tations could generate a virtuous circle of rapid returns and economic prosperity. Other
small states and larger states are on the good paths, including both Russia and Iran which
lost large absolute numbers of tertiary educated people (475,095 for Russia and 315,640 for
Iran). Given their size, these numbers represent relatively small proportions of their edu-
cated labor force (2.4 percent in Russia and 14.7 in Iran). These proportions are too low to
result from coordination problems. For most large countries, the bad long-run equilibrium
is irrelevant, as it would entail one–hundred-percent brain drain. Nevertheless, 27 of them
exhibit a non-trivial bad equilibrium with reasonably high brain drain and poverty; these
27 countries thus risk a radical worsening of their economic performance. These results are
fairly robust to our identiﬁcation strategy and to the inclusion of “brain gain” mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework and derives
the conditions under which multiplicity is obtained. Our benchmark model follows the
“traditional” literature on brain drain and development, i.e. considers the brain drain as
unambiguously detrimental for human capital accumulation. In Section 3, we use macrodata
to calibrate the benchmark model on developing countries and to identify country-speciﬁc
characteristics. This allows us to characterize the type of equilibrium observed in each
developing country. In Section 4, we analyze the robustness of our results to identifying
assumptions and account for the recent “brain gain” literature. Finally, we present our
conclusions in Section 5.
52 Theory
Our model depicts a set of developing economy with endogenous technology, high-skill emi-
gration and human-capital accumulation. Time is discrete. One period is meant to describe
the active life of one generation. Each developing country is characterized by a linear pro-
duction function with two perfectly substitutable inputs, high-skill and low-skill labor (Ht
and Lt), and an endogenous productivity factor λt:
Yt = λt (ωLt + Ht) (1)
where ω < 1 is the average productivity of low-skill workers relative to high-skill workers.
Hence, high-skill workers’ income is equal to λt whereas low-skill workers earn ωλt. The
assumption of perfect substitutability of the two types of labor is made for mathematical
simplicity. It obviously implies that the skill premium is exogenous. This is in line with
Rosenzweig (2007, 2008) who shows that cross-country diﬀerences in skill prices are much
more aﬀected by diﬀerences in base wages (λt) than by diﬀerences in returns to skills (1/ω).
In addition, many empirical studies advocate using a high elasticity of substitution to match
data on the skill premium in developing countries.3
We consider a Lucas-type technological externality (see Lucas, 1988) and assume that the









where A is a country ﬁxed eﬀect, γt is a time trend which is common to all developing and
developed countries (γ > 1), and α ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of productivity to the skill-ratio.
Preferences are represented by an indirect utility function assumed to be logarithmic in
income. Low-skill individuals are immobile across countries whereas high-skill individuals
have the choice between staying in their country or emigrating to a richer industrialized
country before entering the labor market. Migration is permanent and we disregard the links
between migrants and their origin country (such as remittances and diaspora externalities).
Productivity or income at destination is exogenous and denoted by λt = ¯ Aγt with ¯ A > 0.
We do not endogenize ¯ A as a function of the skill-ratio at destination, implicitly assuming
that high-skill immigration from each developing country is too small to aﬀect productivity.
Hence, our model is only relevant to the analysis of developing countries.
3Ottaviano and Peri (2008) use a range of estimates between 1.5 and 3 whereas Angrist (1995) recommends
a value above 2 to explain the trends in the college premium on the Palestinian labor market.
6Migration induces heterogenous moving costs which must be subtracted from the utility
level. We denote the migration cost if individual i by ˜ εi. Hence, migration is optimal for
individual i if and only if
ln ¯ A − ˜ εi ≥ lnA + αlnkt.
At time t, all individuals with migration costs below a critical value εt ﬁnd it optimal to
emigrate. The critical value is given by
εt = ln ¯ A − lnA − αlnkt (3)
The threshold εt is decreasing with the skill-ratio kt and characterizes the income diﬀerential
(in logs) with high-income destinations. At the margin, the migration costs for the individual
who is indiﬀerent between migrating or staying is equal to the income diﬀerential. It can
reasonably be used as an index of poverty (or underdevelopment) of the country.
Migration costs are distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G(˜ ε) with
location parameter m and dispersion parameter b. Hence, Gt = G(εt) measures the propor-
tion of high-skill emigrants at time t, i.e. the rate of brain drain. We impose Assumption 1
on G(˜ ε).
Assumption 1 The distribution function of migration costs satisﬁes4
G
0(x) = o(exp(−x/α))whenx → +∞
As will be evident later, Assumption 1 is a suﬃcient condition to obtain multiplicity of equi-
libria and coordination failures. It holds when G0(˜ ε) goes to 0 much faster than exp(−˜ ε/α)
as ˜ ε goes to inﬁnity. This implies that the migration choice is sensitive enough to the wage
diﬀerential when this diﬀerential is large.
Assumption 1 always holds when the cumulative distribution function G(˜ ε) reaches one for a
value of x ∈ R. It is also always satisﬁed if G(˜ ε) is a normal distribution with positive mean,
or if G(˜ ε) is a Gumbel distribution with positive location. If G(˜ ε) is a logistic distribution,
Assumption 1 holds provided that b, the scale of the distribution, is larger than α.
At this stage, it is useful to distinguish kt, the skill-ratio in the ex post (or after-migration)
resident labor force and zt, the skill-ratio in the ex ante (or before-migration) native labor
4o(.) means little-o of (Landau notation).
7force. Since only educated workers migrate at a rate G(εt), we obviously have
kt = zt [1 − G(εt)] (4)
The dynamics are governed by human capital accumulation. For simplicity, it is assumed
that high-skill workers educate all their children whereas low-skill workers only educate a
fraction q ∈ (0,1) of them. q is assumed to be exogenous. Denoting the skilled population
















Where ns and nu measure the number of children in high-skill and low-skill households.
Denoting by n = ns/nu the relative number of children in high-skill households (compared












Our model is made up of Equations (1) to (5). In these equations, we consider that param-
eters ¯ A > 0, α ∈ (0,1) and n ∈ (0,1) are identical across developing countries. The other
exogenous parameters A, q, m and b are country-speciﬁc. Hence, a developing country can
be identiﬁed as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A developing country is a quadruple Ω = {A,q,m,b}representing the tech-
nological ﬁxed eﬀect (A > 0), the fraction of educated children in low-skill households
(q ∈ (0,1)), the location and the scale parameters of the distribution of migration costs
(m ∈ R, b > 0).
The parameters and country characteristics determine the level and the time path of the two
main endogenous variables, the index of poverty εt and the ex ante skill-ratio zt. Indeed,
when trajectories for εt and zt are known, it is straightforward to compute the trajectories
of the other endogenous variables (λt,Yt,kt). In other words, the system of Equations (1) to
(5) can easily be reduced to a two-variable system.
Deﬁnition 2 Given an initial skill-ratio in the native labor force ¯ z0 > 0, an inter-temporal
equilibrium with migration is a vector of the skill-ratios {zt}t≥0 ∈ R∞
+ and a vector of poverty
8indexes {εt}t≥0 ∈ R∞ such that z0 = ¯ z0 and ∀t ≥ 0:
εt = ln ¯ A − lnA[(1 − G(εt))zt]







nzt ≡ h(εt,zt). (7)
Equation (6) is a static incentive compatibility condition. For a given ex ante skill-ratio
zt, it characterizes the combination(s) of poverty index εt and high-skill emigration rate
G(εt) compatible with the technology level and households’ emigration decisions at time t.
Equation (7) is dynamic and characterizes human-capital accumulation. For a given ex ante
skill-ratio and poverty index at time t, it gives the ex ante skill-ratio at time t + 1.
We have the following result:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a threshold ˆ z such that, in equilibrium, zt > ˆ z
∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove the lemma using a reductio ad absurdum argument. Suppose we have an
equilibrium with, at some date s, zs < ˆ z. We will show that there can be no εs satisfying









The function φ(ε) is continuous. Its limit when ε → −∞ is equal to +∞. Under Assump-
tion 1, its limit when ε → +∞ is equal to +∞. It therefore has a global minimum at some
ˆ ε. This global minimum should satisfy:
φ
0(ˆ ε) = 0 ⇔ 1 − G(ˆ ε) − αG
0(ˆ ε) = 0
Let us deﬁne ˆ z = φ(ˆ ε). There is no ε ∈ R such that φ(ε) < ˆ z. As a consequence there is no
ε ∈ R solving (6) for z < ˆ z. Hence, when zs < ˆ z, (6) could not hold and this cannot be an
equilibrium.
We now introduce a second assumption, which is in no way crucial for the following results,
but greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.
Assumption 2 The distribution function of migration costs is such that there is a unique
ε satisfying
1 − G(ε) − αG
0(ε) = 0.
9This implies that:
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any level zt > ˆ z there exist two values of εt,
s+(zt) > s−(zt), such that the incentive constraint εt = f(εt,zt) holds.
Proof. Consider the function z = φ(ε) ⇔ ε − f(ε,z) = 0. We have seen in the proof above
that it goes from +∞ to +∞ as ε goes from −∞ to +∞, and has a global minimum at the
point (ˆ ε, ˆ z). Assumption 2 implies that this function changes slope only once, at its minimum.
As a consequence, for any zt > ˆ z, there are two values of εt such that εt − f(εt,zt) = 0. Let
us denote these two solutions s+(zt) > s−(zt).
The solution s+(zt) corresponds to a high poverty index and high brain drain: the ex post
skill ratio kt is well below the ex ante level zt and the productivity level is low. Solution
s−(zt) corresponds to a low poverty index and low brain drain: the ex post skill ratio kt
is closer to the ex ante level zt and the productivity level is higher. At each t, there are










If these two values are above ˆ z, we can compute four values of zt+2 using Equations (6) and
(7), eight values of zt+3 and so on. Hence there may be an inﬁnite number of equilibria,
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In order to describe the possible long-run outcomes more precisely, we list here some prop-
erties of the two functions h(s+(zt),zt) and h(s−(zt),zt):
10• h(s+(ˆ z), ˆ z) = h(s−(ˆ z), ˆ z) = h(ˆ ε, ˆ z);
• since φ0
ε < 0 for ε < ˆ ε, and s−(zt) is a decreasing function, the function h(s−(zt),zt) is
increasing in zt;
• since s+(zt) > s−(zt), h(s−(zt),zt) > h(s+(zt),zt);
• when z tends to inﬁnity, the function h(s−(zt),zt) tends to the oblique asymptote







• when z tends to inﬁnity, the function h(s+(zt),zt) tends to the horizontal asymptote




Figure 1 represents a dynamic correspondence which satisﬁes the properties derived above.
The following proposition summarizes the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 an inter-temporal equilibrium exists under the
conditions:
When h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) > ˆ z, an equilibrium exists if z0 > ˆ z.
When h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) < ˆ z,
• no equilibrium exists if h(s−(z),z) < z for all z > 0.
• if there exists ˜ z > 0 such that h(s−(˜ z), ˜ z) < ˜ z and if ¯ z0 ≥ z, where z is the smallest
steady state of the dynamics zt+1 = h(s−(zt),zt), an equilibrium exists.
Proof. When h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) > ˆ z, z0 > ˆ z ensures that there is at least one inter-temporal equilibrium
satisfying the monotone dynamics zt+1 = h(s−(zt),zt).
When h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) < ˆ z, if h(s−(z),z) < z for all z > 0, the function h(s−(zt),zt) < zt lies below the
forty-ﬁve degree line for all zt, all the possible dynamics starting from ¯ z0 are decreasing, and
there will inevitably be some date T at which zt < ˆ z. Hence, no inter-temporal equilibrium
exists.
When h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) < ˆ z, if there exists ˜ z > 0 such that h(s−(˜ z), ˜ z) < ˜ z, the function h(s−(zt),zt)













low brain drain path
high brain drain path
Figure 1: Dynamic correspondence
of the dynamics zt+1 = h(s−(zt),zt). Provided that ¯ z0 ≥ z , there exists at least one inter-
temporal equilibrium (see De la Croix and Michel (2002), Proposition 3.6, for a similar case
in the context of pension systems).
Obviously, as soon as one inter-temporal equilibrium exists, an inﬁnite number of such
equilibria exist.
The key condition separating the two cases of Proposition 1, h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) > ˆ z, can be expressed
explicitly as a condition on the productivity parameter A in the case where the function G(ε)
is a Gumbel distribution, which is a common assumption in endogenous migration models
given the nice mathematical properties of that distribution:
























⇔ h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) < ˆ z
Hence, the non-existence of equilibrium can only arise when productivity is small enough,
given the other parameters.
We now derive some comparative static results in the context of a Gumbel distribution of
migration costs. Results can be obtained for the point p = {ˆ z,h(ˆ ε, ˆ z)}:












. We ﬁrst compute h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) which gives:













Using the partial derivatives of ˆ z and h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) with respect to the parameters of interest, q,
























































































Equations (10) and (11) indicate that, when q or n increases, the point p moves vertically
upward. The conditions for existence would be unchanged in the case where h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) > ˆ z
(ˆ z is unchanged) or easier to fulﬁl in the case where h(ˆ ε, ˆ z) < ˆ z as the smallest steady
state z would be lowered. If the slope of the function does not change too much (which is
what simulations indicate), it would also imply that the high steady state would be higher.
This implies that education policies and/or population policies increasing n make the good
13stationary equilibrium better.
Equations (12) and (13) show that increasing location m or decreasing Φ (i.e. increasing
productivity A) move the point p unambiguously to the South-West. Hence it enlarges the
scope for the existence of equilibria (ˆ z is lower).
Remark on Trembling-Hand Perfection
When multiplicity occurs in static Nash equilibria, it is very common to question the “sta-
bility” of these equilibria. Although this notion of stability is sometimes judged dynamically
naive (see Varian, 1992, p288),5 it can be used as a tool to restrict the set of admissible Nash
equilibria. An interesting notion proposed by Selten (1975) is that of the trembling-hand
perfect Nash equilibrium, which selects Nash equilibria which are robust to the possibility
that some players may make small mistakes. In order to apply this notion to our case, we
draw the costs and beneﬁts of migration, as a function of the migration rate. Letting migra-
tion g vary, the utility cost of the marginal person is G−1(g). The beneﬁt from migration is,
from Equation (6),
f(ε,z) = ln ¯ A − lnA[(1 − g))z]
α
Figure 2 plots the two functions. The concave-convex black curve is the cost G−1(g). The
grey curve is the beneﬁt. It is a convex function of migration because home productivity
and wages are a concave function of the skill ratio. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, these curves
intersect twice, because Equation (6) has two roots. Let us now assess the trembling-hand
perfection of these two Nash equilibria. Consider ﬁrst the equilibrium on the left, which
is the one with low poverty and low brain drain. Suppose that somebody made a mistake
and that, for example, the person with a migration cost just above the threshold level ε
migrated. As the grey curve is quite ﬂat in that region, this move has only a slight positive
eﬀect on the relative gain of migration, through depressing local income via the externality.
For him/her and the others with a higher εi, the cost (in black) is still higher than the
beneﬁt (in grey), and nobody moves. This equilibrium is trembling-hand perfect. Consider
now the equilibrium on the right, the one with high poverty and high brain drain. If there
is, by mistake, an additional migrant, we see that the beneﬁt increases very sharply (the
grey curve increases very fast at that point). This is because the economy is already poor
in skilled persons, and so the marginal loss of an additional skilled worker is high. Then,
5This is probably why Acemoglu (1995), among others, does not use a stability criterion to discriminate
between static equilibria, but introduces the notion of stability only when he proposes a truly dynamic
extension of his model.









Figure 2: Nash equilibria
for households with a higher εi, there is a gain in moving too. This equilibrium is not
trembling-hand perfect.
Although such arguments are often used to select a unique Nash equilibrium, let us stress that
they are not very robust. To illustrate this point, let us modify the externality we assumed
in Equation (2). Instead of following Lucas (1988), let us adopt Azariadis and Drazen’s
(1990) view that there are threshold externalities in technology. Having a skill ratio above
a certain threshold allows access to better technologies. λt would then be a step function of
kt: there would be a partition {t0,t1,...tn} of R+ representing the diﬀerent thresholds, such
that the function is constant on each (ti−1,ti). This case is represented in Figure 3 where
we have assumed a step function with many levels (considering Equation (2) as a smooth
approximation of a true model with a step function). The equilibrium on the right is now
trembling-hand perfect: if an agent deviates, this will neither aﬀect the technology, nor the
gain from migrating, as the grey curve is locally horizontal, and nobody else would deviate
from this equilibrium.
A similar argument could be made on the basis of institutional choices rather than tech-
nology levels. If the skill ratio can buy a level of institutional development (aﬀecting total
factor productivity), equilibria are stable as long as agents strictly prefer the current regime
to the alternatives. Then, any epsilon change in the environment should not perturb the
equilibrium. These arguments show that it makes little sense to put too much weight on the
reﬁnement of the Nash equilibria in our context, as any result could easily be overturned by
slightly changing the technology.









Figure 3: Nash equilibria with threshold externalities
3 Quantitative assessment
The goal of this section is to calibrate common and country-speciﬁc parameters, to draw the
dynamic correspondence for each developing country, and to determine whether the observed
situation corresponds to the high or the low brain-drain path. We use data on highly skilled
emigration stocks/rates and on the labor force by education level as shown in the Appendix
(available upon request). Three levels of education are distinguished, individuals with upper-
secondary education, those with less than upper-secondary, and those with post-secondary
education. High-skill workers are deﬁned as those in the last category. Data on GDP are
from the Penn World Tables. Our calibration is based on the year 2000 and is summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated parameters - summary
Prm. Deﬁnition Source Value
Global parameters
α Elasticity of productivity to human cap Regressions 1990-2000 0.277
A Productivity in developed countries Mean of 9 main dest 64.2
n Fertility diﬀerential (as a ratio) Kremer & Chen (1999) 0.605
Developing countries speciﬁc parameters
A Technological ﬁxed eﬀect Equation (16)
q Prop of educ. children in low-skill hous. Equation (17)
m Location of the mig. cost distrib. Equation (19)
b Scale of the mig. cost distrib Equation (18)
163.1 Calibration of common parameters
Remember that parameters α ∈ (0,1) (the elasticity of productivity to the skill-ratio), ¯ A > 0
(productivity in leading countries), and n ∈ (0,1) (the fertility diﬀerential between high-skill
and low-skill workers) are assumed to be identical in all developing countries.
To calibrate α, we regress lnλj,t on lnkj,t. Data on the labor force by education level are
used to compute kj,t. The numbers of high-skill, low-skill and medium-skill resident workers
(Hj,t,L1
j,t,L2
j,t) are available for each country j from Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk’s database
for 1990 and 2000. High-skill workers (Hj,t) are those with post-secondary education. In
the low-skill group, we distinguish workers with upper secondary education (L1
j,t) and those
with less than upper secondary (L2







To compute λj,t, we use Equation (1) given estimates of the relative productivity of low-skill
and medium-skill workers, ω1 and ω2. In a sample including many developing countries,
Rosenzweig (2007, 2008) estimated an average return to schooling of between 7 and 10
percent per year. Considering that high-skill workers have 15 more years of schooling than
the low skilled and 6 more years than the medium skilled, this gives 0.21 < ω1 < 0.34 and
0.56 < ω2 < 0.67. In our simulations, we use ω1 = 0.25 and ω2 = 0.60. Given GDP data,







We use data for 1990 and 2000, and normalize γ00 to unity and γ90 = A90/A00 in Equation
(2). Regressing lnλj,t/γt on lnkj,t gives an estimate for α. Using a large sample of developing
countries (142 observations), we obtain an elasticity of 0.277, signiﬁcant at 1 percent (the
R-squared of the regression is 0.24). This elasticity will be used in the benchmark simulation.
Using a larger sample of 195 developing and developed countries, we obtain an elasticity of
0.447 (the R-squared is 0.38). This larger value will be used in the robustness analysis.
The calibrated productivity in leading countries, ¯ A, is the weighted average of the produc-
tivity scale factors obtained from (15) for 9 major destination countries (Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States).
The weights are the country’s shares in the total labor force of the group. We obtain
¯ A = 64.18.
17Using data from Kremer and Chen (1999), we compute the diﬀerential fertility for 1985-89
for 26 developing countries (to our knowledge there is no broader set of data on diﬀerential
fertility than this one). The correlation between country-speciﬁc fertility diﬀerentials and the
human capital of women is low (14 percent) so that we can consider the fertility diﬀerential
as independent of the level of development. The average fertility diﬀerential between high-
skill (more than 10 years of education) and low-skill workers (less than 10 years of schooling)
amounts to 0.605. We use this value for n in all countries.
3.2 Calibration of country-speciﬁc characteristics
As stated in Deﬁnition 1, each developing country j is characterized by a quadruple of
parameters Ωj = {Aj,qj,mj,bj} representing the technological ﬁxed eﬀect (Aj > 0), the
fraction of educated children in low-skill households (qj ∈ (0,1)), the location and the scale
parameters of the distribution of migration cost (mj ∈ R,bj > 0).
The calibration of the technological ﬁxed eﬀect Aj is done at the year 2000. Using Equa-
tion (2) and the estimated value for α, we have:
lnAj = lnλ2000,j − 0.277 × lnk2000,j (16)
where k2000,j and λ2000,j are given by Equations (14) and (15).
To calibrate qj, we use the dynamic equation (5) and consider that one period represents
25 years. The proportion of high-skill workers in the resident labor force (ex post or after-
migration labor force), kj,75 , can be obtained for 1975 from Defoort (2008), herself relying on
diﬀerent sources (mostly Barro and Lee, 2000). The proportion of high-skill workers in the
native labor force (ex ante or before-migration labor force), zj,00, can be obtained for 2000
by adding resident and emigrant workers by education level and computing the structure of
the native labor force. Data on human capital and emigrants to OECD destinations in 2000
are taken from Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009). Generally speaking, the skill level of
immigrants to non-OECD countries is expected to be very low, except in a few countries
such as South Africa, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and some East
Asian countries such as Singapore or Hong Kong. Focusing on OECD destinations, the
database should capture a large fraction of worldwide educated migration (between 80 and
90 percent), but is also likely to underestimate the number of emigrants from developing
countries located in the neighborhood of important destinations. Here, we have collected
or estimated data from non-OECD destinations to expand the coverage of previous studies.
We double the number of destinations, adding 31 non-OECD destinations, compute more
18accurate measures of the brain drain for all the world countries, and characterize “South-
South” and “North-South” emigration patterns. As expected, the inclusion of non-OECD
countries such as the Gulf states, South Africa, and Singapore has a impact on the brain














For all countries excepted Saint Kitts and Nevis (q = 0.4574), we have q < 1−n so that the
oblique asymptote on Figure 1 has a slope lower than one.
Finally, we have to specify a functional form for the distribution of migration costs and
estimate its parameters. In the benchmark analysis, migration costs are assumed to follow
a Gumbel distribution with country-speciﬁc parameters m ∈ R (location) and b > 0 (scale).
The mean and variance of the distribution is related to the location and scale parameters as
follows: mean = m−γb where γ is Euler’s constant (0.577), and variance = π2b2/6. Inverting
G(ε) gives
εj−mj
bj = G−1(Gj) = ln[−ln(1 − Gj)]. The Gumbel distribution is a continuous
probability distribution belonging to the family of generalized extreme value distributions.
It is traditionally used in migration models where utility includes an iid random component
varying between individuals and countries of destination (see Grogger and Hanson, 2008).6
The logistic or normal distributions will be used in the robustness analysis.
Since this function has two country-speciﬁc parameters, we need two observations to calibrate
them. For each developing country, we can compute εj ≡ ln ¯ A − lnA − αlnkj and observe
Gj in 2000. This gives a ﬁrst pair(εj,Gj) which can be used to identify the parameters of the
distribution. We need another reference pair (εmin,Gmin) to characterize the hypothetical
brain drain rate Gmin obtained with low poverty level εmin. In the benchmark analysis, we
assume that at the level of the US income (εUS), the brain drain of each developing country





mj ≡ εj − bj × G
−1(Gj). (19)
The coeﬃcients (mj,bj) capture the mean of migration costs and the average sensitivity of
6As shown by McFadden (1984), when the iid component follows an extreme value distribution, the
probability that an individual emigrates to a particular destination is governed by a simple logit expression.
19migration to income diﬀerentials. Given (18) and (19), mj and bj are perfectly collinear. The
recent empirical literature on international migration reveals that the propensity to emigrate
is a function of the distance to OECD countries, language spoken, country size and cultural
links with potential destinations, etc. A simple correlation analysis reveals that mj (and
hence bj) is positively correlated with population size (0.32) and distance to OECD (0.20),
and negatively correlated with dummies capturing former colonial ties (-0.43), knowledge of
English (-0.26) and being an oil producing country (-0.10).
Consequently, the mean of the distribution is low in small states and small islands, and in
regions such as Central America and the Caribbean, Northern and Southern Africa, the new
members of the European Union and countries located in the neighborhood of the Persian
Gulf states. On the contrary, mj is higher in the ex-Soviet block, in South-East and East
Asia, in many countries of South America, and Central Africa.
3.3 Benchmark conﬁgurations
The calibration of country-speciﬁc parameters allows us to draw the dynamic correspon-
dence (8) for each developing country, to compute steady state equilibria and check their
stability, and to compare the observed equilibrium path to the alternative one when multi-
plicity occurs. Our numerical exercise was conducted on 147 developing countries and gave
the following results.
All countries except Croatia and Saint Kitts and Nevis are characterized by 2 locally stable
steady state equilibria, the “low-brain-drain” steady state equilibrium (z−,G−) and the
“high-brain-drain” steady state equilibrium (z+,G+).7 Figure 3.3 represents the dynamic
correspondence for two countries, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago. In Guatemala, the
observed dynamics lie on the upper part of the correspondence, i.e. on the low-brain-drain
dynamics. If they stay on the same path, the dynamics will converge monotonically to a
steady state, at the intersection of this path with the 45-degree line. In Trinidad and Tobago,
the observed dynamics lie on the lower part of the correspondence, i.e. on the high-brain-
drain dynamics. If they stay on the same path, the dynamics will converge with damped
oscillations to a steady state. At each date, another path with lower brain drain is possible,
though.
Large countries exhibit high migration costs. Considering the 105 countries with more than
2 million inhabitants, the observed equilibrium in 2000 (z00,G00) is on the good path in
7In Croatia, (z+,G+) is unstable. As mentioned above, in Saint Kitts and Nevis the oblique asymptote
on Figure 1 has a slope higher than one implying that the dynamics can be unbounded.
20the vast majority of cases, as for Guatemala above. Only two cases are on the bad path.
Jamaica exhibits a brain drain of 84.7 percent. Remaining on the bad path, its brain drain
would reach 86.3 percent in 2025 and 86.2 percent at the steady state. Moving to the good
path would reduce the long-run brain drain to 3.0 percent. Haiti exhibits a brain drain of
83.4 percent. Remaining on the bad path, its brain drain would reach 86.0 percent in 2025
and 85.8 percent at the steady state. Moving to the good path would reduce the long-run
brain drain to 18.7 percent.














Figure 4: Correspondences for Guatemala (left), and Trinidad and Tobago (right)
The 103 other countries with population above 2 million are on the good path. The bad
path is usually a trivial situation with more than 95 percent brain drain and high poverty.
We have 14 exceptions for which the bad path involves a brain drain below 90 percent (See
Table 2). In these countries, a major adverse shock could have damaging long-run eﬀects
on the economy if it gives rise to a sudden and uncoordinated emigration of the highly
skilled. These are the Dominican Republic (5.5 vs 85.6 percent)8, El Salvador (10.0 vs 83.6),
Guatemala (10.0 vs 90.0), Lebanon (8.4 vs 75.0), Macedonia (20.4 vs 87.7) Malaysia (2.5 vs
72.3), Mexico (5.1 vs 89.6), Namibia (19.3 vs 82.6), Nicaragua (19.6 vs 89.1), Papua New
Guinea (7.5 vs 80.8), Tunisia (4.7 vs 89.8), Uruguay (3.5 vs 79.2), the Czech Republic (2.9
vs 87.8) and Hungary.(3.7 vs 77.8).
In the 42 small states with less than 2 million inhabitants, the conﬁguration is mixed. On the
one hand, 22 small states are on the good path (z−,G−) in 2000. Table 3 lists these countries
and gives their equilibrium in 2025 and at the steady state, provided that they remain on
8Numbers in parentheses are G−
ss and G+
ss in percent for the 14 countries.














Czech Republic 0.133 0.090 0.181 0.056 0.283 0.029 0.109 0.878
Dominican Republic 0.219 0.227 0.320 0.131 0.629 0.055 0.221 0.856
El Salvador 0.176 0.323 0.243 0.204 0.434 0.100 0.181 0.836
Guatemala 0.080 0.244 0.112 0.164 0.174 0.100 0.078 0.899
Hungary 0.158 0.134 0.210 0.081 0.336 0.037 0.138 0.778
Lebanon 0.214 0.455 0.283 0.248 0.591 0.084 0.242 0.750
Macedonia 0.236 0.320 0.277 0.272 0.373 0.204 0.180 0.877
Malaysia 0.098 0.174 0.141 0.075 0.244 0.025 0.107 0.723
Mexico 0.150 0.156 0.213 0.098 0.360 0.051 0.137 0.896
Namibia 0.059 0.294 0.068 0.248 0.085 0.193 0.047 0.826
Nicaragua 0.145 0.324 0.177 0.264 0.241 0.196 0.120 0.891
Papua New Guinea 0.021 0.289 0.030 0.153 0.049 0.074 0.024 0.808
Tunisia 0.074 0.143 0.107 0.086 0.171 0.047 0.071 0.898
Uruguay 0.163 0.120 0.214 0.075 0.336 0.035 0.136 0.792
the good path. Except in the Solomon Islands, the brain drain is expected to decrease in
these countries; the average emigration rate in this group amounts to 29.6 percent in 2000
and will fall to 18.3 percent in the long-run (23.0 percent in 2025). The alternative brain
drain rate is below 90 percent in 11 countries which face substantial risks of coordination
failure. On the other hand, 20 small states are on the bad path (z+,G+) in 2000. Table 4
shows that the emigration rate will increase in all these countries; the average rate equals
69.5 percent in 2000 and will reach 75.9 percent in the long-run (76.9 percent in 2025).
For other countries with populations above 2 million, we predict a signiﬁcant decrease in the
brain drain, provided that they remain on the same branch of the dynamic path. Exceptions
are Jamaica and Haiti (on the bad path), Pakistan and Nigeria. The average emigration
rate is equal to 19.1 percent in 2000. It will fall to 15.5 percent in 2025 and 12.6 percent in
the long-run.
In sum, according to our model, 22 countries (including 20 small states, Jamaica and Haiti)
are suﬀering from a coordination failure. By repatriating highly skilled natives working
abroad, they would reach a productivity level suﬃcient to encourage high-skill workers to stay
and generating more human capital accumulation. This represents 15 percent of the sample,
but 47.6 percent of countries with less than 2 million inhabitants. Hence, coordination failure
leading to massive high-skill emigration is an important problem when migration costs are
low. In 25 other cases, the risk of a coordination failure is high.














Bahamas 0.338 0.259 0.507 0.043 1.474 0.002 0.441 0.622
Botswana 0.045 0.084 0.068 0.050 0.108 0.028 0.043 0.948
Comoros 0.026 0.231 0.035 0.195 0.048 0.165 0.023 0.997
Djibouti 0.058 0.039 0.080 0.034 0.117 0.028 0.045 1.000
East Timor 0.065 0.222 0.082 0.203 0.104 0.185 0.050 1.000
Equatorial Guinea 0.053 0.220 0.076 0.067 0.133 0.017 0.064 0.650
Estonia 0.278 0.111 0.419 0.066 0.858 0.027 0.248 0.925
Gabon 0.143 0.049 0.224 0.026 0.404 0.012 0.135 0.953
Gambia 0.013 0.682 0.013 0.650 0.014 0.612 0.012 0.857
Guinea-Bissau 0.014 0.289 0.018 0.260 0.023 0.237 0.012 1.000
Kiribati 0.034 0.558 0.039 0.479 0.048 0.403 0.032 0.885
Lesotho 0.014 0.248 0.019 0.197 0.027 0.159 0.013 0.991
Marshall Islands 0.135 0.429 0.163 0.355 0.218 0.271 0.121 0.882
Micronesia 0.148 0.487 0.176 0.376 0.258 0.240 0.146 0.788
Namibia 0.059 0.294 0.068 0.248 0.085 0.193 0.047 0.826
Nauru 0.053 0.721 0.059 0.604 0.074 0.475 0.055 0.835
Sao Tome and Principe 0.043 0.275 0.060 0.228 0.083 0.192 0.041 0.997
Slovenia 0.191 0.126 0.234 0.044 0.372 0.007 0.199 0.426
Solomon Islands 0.020 0.260 0.019 0.271 0.018 0.288 0.010 0.941
Swaziland 0.055 0.195 0.080 0.061 0.140 0.016 0.066 0.673
Tuvalu 0.043 0.652 0.048 0.539 0.062 0.415 0.044 0.824
Vanuatu 0.084 0.084 0.111 0.073 0.154 0.063 0.061 1.000
4 Robustness
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our results to the identifying strategy and to
the brain-gain mechanism, which implies the endogeneity of qj.
4.1 Robustness to identifying assumptions
Our benchmark numerical exercise is based on three major identifying assumptions:
• The elasticity of productivity to human capital is estimated on a sample of developing
countries. We obtained α= 0.277. Using the full sample of 195 countries, the elasticity
goes up to α = 0.447. A priori, a higher α can reinforce the possibility of multi-
ple equilibria since it increases the sensitivity of economic performances to high-skill
emigration.














Antigua and Barbuda 0.457 0.704 0.553 0.781 0.541 0.774 3.258 0.002
Barbados 0.363 0.627 0.460 0.727 0.453 0.721 1.907 0.000
Belize 0.284 0.656 0.345 0.753 0.336 0.743 1.128 0.009
Cape Verde 0.059 0.828 0.065 0.849 0.065 0.848 0.161 0.007
Cyprus 0.318 0.353 0.399 0.502 0.394 0.494 NA 0.000
Dominica 0.471 0.641 0.608 0.755 0.591 0.746 3.885 0.000
Fiji 0.206 0.628 0.236 0.775 0.223 0.738 0.466 0.145
Grenada 0.611 0.843 0.682 0.865 0.679 0.864 15.495 0.000
Guyana 0.388 0.894 0.413 0.904 0.411 0.904 1.966 0.032
Malta 0.168 0.585 0.193 0.630 0.193 0.641 NA 0.000
Mauritius 0.091 0.419 0.115 0.579 0.113 0.567 0.233 0.000
Palau 0.258 0.838 0.285 0.850 0.285 0.854 NA 0.000
Saint Kitts & Nevis 0.866 0.844 0.994 0.866 0.991 0.866 ∞ 0.000
Saint Lucia 0.152 0.687 0.164 0.736 0.162 0.729 0.377 0.050
Saint Vinc & Grenadines 0.309 0.846 0.326 0.857 0.325 0.856 1.291 0.004
Samoa 0.291 0.735 0.323 0.814 0.313 0.796 0.722 0.171
Seychelles 0.187 0.572 0.235 0.688 0.231 0.680 0.619 0.000
Suriname 0.271 0.660 0.320 0.759 0.310 0.745 0.933 0.032
Tonga 0.313 0.757 0.346 0.815 0.338 0.804 0.897 0.125
Trinidad and Tobago 0.226 0.790 0.250 0.814 0.249 0.813 0.812 0.000
• Individual migration costs are assumed to follow a Gumbel cumulative distribution
function. In this section, we consider two other distributions characterized by two
location and dispersion parameters, the logistic and the normal distributions.
• The identiﬁcation of the parameters of the migration costs’ distribution relies on the
hypothesis that at the US income level (εUS = −0.013), developing countries would
have the same brain drain as the US (i.e. GUS = 0.005). Since most cases of coordina-
tion failure occur for small states, the minimal brain drain of these countries may be
expected to exceed the US level at high income. In this section, we identify the param-
eters of the distribution on the Qatar income and brain-drain levels (εQat = −0.382
and GQat = 0.023), Qatar being a small state with about 745,000 inhabitants according
to our deﬁnition.
In Table 5, we identify the cases of coordination failures in 12 scenarios: 2 values for α
× 3 distributions × 2 values for (εmin,Gmin). Unsurprisingly, the number of coordination
failures increases when α = 0.447, and decreases when the parameters of the migration costs’
24distribution are calibrated on Qatar. The use of the normal distribution (and logistic to a
lesser extent) also reduces the number of countries on the bad path.
For 7 countries, a coordination failure is obtained in all scenarios. These are Cape Verde,
Grenada, Palau, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and Grenadines, Malta, and Trinidad and
Tobago. For 7 other countries, a coordination default is obtained under 10 scenarios: Belize,
Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, Seychelles, Antigua and Barbuda, and Barbados. Mauritius
and Cyprus are also robust cases.
4.2 Robustness to ”brain gain” channel
As stated in the introduction, a wave of brain-drain research has emerged since the mid-1990s
around the idea that highly skilled emigration generates positive feedback eﬀects for sending
countries. In particular, it has been demonstrated that high-skill migration prospects can
foster domestic enrolment in education in developing countries, raising the possibility of the
brain drain being beneﬁcial to the source country (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; Beine
et al., 2001, 2008).
This “brain gain” hypothesis can be introduced into our model by endogenizing qj as a
function of the current emigration rate. In line with the recent “brain gain” literature, a
simple regression of identiﬁed qj (obtained from (17)) on observed high-skill emigration rates
Gj shows a positive and highly signiﬁcant relationship (p-value below 1 percent). We have
qj = C +0.095 Gj +ηj where C is the intercept and ηj is a error term. Deﬁning q0,j ≡ C +ηj
as a country-speciﬁc constant, we obtain an identiﬁed model matching observations and
compatible with the brain gain view. The brain gain variant is made of Equations (6) and
(7) from Deﬁnition 2, and the training technology (subscript j is removed to be compatible
with deﬁnition 2):
q = q0 + 0.095 G ≡ q(G). (20)
Unlike the benchmark model, the long-run level of human capital kss is now an ambiguous
function of the high-skill emigration rate G. To illustrate this, let us ﬁrst treat G as an
exogenous variable and characterize its eﬀect on human capital accumulation. At the steady
state, combining (4) and (5) gives
kss =
(1 − G) · q(G)




−q(G)[1 − q(G)] +
∂q
∂G(1 − G)[1 − n(1 − G)]
[1 − q(G) − n(1 − G)]
2 .
25Table 5: Robustness to identifying assumptions: x indicates a coordination failure case
Identiﬁcation m,b USA Qatar USA
G(.) Gumbel Logistic Normal Gumbel Logistic Normal Gumbel
α α α α α α α α α α α α α α
Brain gain no no no no no no no no no no no no yes
Belize x x x x x x x x x x x
Cape Verde x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Dominica x x x x x x x x x x x
Fiji x x x x x x
Gambia x x
Grenada x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Guyana x x x x x x x x x x x
Haiti x x x x x x x
Jamaica x x x x x x x x x x x
Kiribati x
Lebanon x x
Mauritius x x x x x x x x x x
Micronesia x x
Nauru x x
Palau x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Saint Kitts & Nevis x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Saint Lucia x x x x x x x x x
Saint Vinc & Gren x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Samoa x x x x x x
Seychelles x x x x x x x x x x x
Suriname x x x x x x x
Tonga x x x x x x
Tuvalu x x
Antigua & Barbuda x x x x x x x x x x x
Bahamas x x
Barbados x x x x x x x x x x x
Cyprus x x x x x x x x x x
Malta x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Trinidad & Tobago x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Coordination failure 22 28 18 29 16 22 15 22 7 17 7 17 22
26Under the traditional view of the benchmark model, we have ∂q/∂G = 0 and ∂kss/∂G < 0,
where ∂q/∂G > 0, ∂kss/∂G can be positive or negative. In particular, the high-skill
emigration rate maximizing the long-run level of residents’ human capital is positive if
[∂kss/∂G]G=0 > 0. This requires 0.095(1−n) > q0(1−q0) (i.e. q0 < 0.039 since n = 0.605 in
our calibration). This condition is very similar to that of Beine et al (2008). Such a situation
is obtained in 64 developing countries (out of 147). More generally, the growth-maximizing
high-skill emigration rate G∗ is the solution of ∂kss/∂G = 0; our numerical experiment re-
veals that G∗ is a decreasing and non-linear function of q0 which can be approximated by
the linear function: G∗ = 0.411 − 10.12 q0.
However, G is clearly endogenous and determined by our system (6 )-(7)-(20). Solving this
system for the 147 developing countries in our sample and provided that countries remain on
the same path as in 2000, we can show that the long-run high-skill emigration rate resulting
from utility maximization is lower than G∗ in 57 cases (i.e. 38.8 percent of our sample).
This result is obtained with the benchmark hypotheses: Gumbel distribution, identiﬁcation
of the parameters of the distribution of migration costs based on the US, and α = α = 0.277.
The key question is: does the brain-gain channel modify the number of coordination failures?
In the previous model disregarding the brain-gain channel, the low brain-drain equilibrium
was always better than the high brain-drain solution in terms of economic performance at
origin. Accounting for brain-gain eﬀect, it is now theoretically possible that the high brain-
drain equilibrium generates higher human capital and productivity at origin than the low
brain-drain one.














Figure 5: Correspondences for Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago with brain-gain eﬀect
27However, our results do not support this possibility. Focusing on our two examples (Guatemala
and Trinidad and Tobago), Figure 5 shows that the dynamic correspondence changes com-
pared to the model with exogenous qj (see Figure 3.3). For low levels of ex ante human
capital zt, the high brain-drain path (dark grey curve) is conducive to more ex ante human
capital in the next period than the low brain-drain path (light grey curve). But the numer-
ical results show that the high brain-drain path always corresponds to the case with low ex
post human capital and high poverty.
Finally, the last column in Table 5 shows that the brain-gain channel does not modify the
number of coordination failures compared to the benchmark scenario of the ﬁrst column.
5 Conclusion
When skilled households expect their home country to have low productivity and to be poorly
governed, the most mobile of them will move to a better place. This can only reinforce the
bad features present at home. On the contrary, if people expect high productivity and good
governance in their home country, they will usually stay at home, thereby promoting high
productivity, good governance, and wealth accumulation.
Such vicious or virtuous circles seem to arise very naturally when one takes into account the
relationship between brain drain and development level in the home country. We accordingly
built a model which is open to the possibility of multiple equilibria. We derived theoretical
conditions under which they eﬀectively arise. Identifying country-speciﬁc parameters in the
data, we classiﬁed countries into diﬀerent categories depending on whether multiple equilibria
are possible, and whether the observed situation might be one of high brain drain and high
poverty.
In most countries, the observed equilibrium has higher income than the other possible equi-
libria. For 22 developing countries (20 small states, Jamaica and Haiti), poverty and high
brain drain are worsened by a coordination failure. By repatriating highly skilled natives
working abroad, they would reach a productivity level inciting high-skill workers to stay
and generating more human capital accumulation. In 25 other countries following the low
brain drain path, there exists a reasonable high brain-drain path involving higher emigration
rates and increased poverty. In these countries, a major adverse shock could have damaging
long-run eﬀects on the economy if it gives rise to a sudden emigration of the highly skilled.
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